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1It is no coincidence that these are the legal rights which have most frequently been
introduced in various national criminal justice systems. The examples mentioned reflect the
standards set by documents adopted by the international community. See, e.g., the United
Nations Declaration on the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power (1985); the Council of Europe Recommendation on the Position of the Victim in the
Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure (1985); and the Statement of Victims’ Rights in
the Process of Criminal Justice (by the European Forum for Victim Services, 1996).
2Marion Brienen, Marc Groenhuijsen, Ernestine Hoegen, ‘Evaluation and Meta-
Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Victim-Oriented Legal Reform in Europe’, Criminologie,
vol. 33, no. 1 (2000), p. 121-144.
3To acknowledge and remedy this deficit, many tools have been designed. On a global
level I point to the Handbook on Justice for Victims. On the Use and Application of the
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (United
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Centre for International Crime
Prevention, New York 1999); and its corollary, the Guide for Policy Makers. On the
Implementation of the United Nations Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention, Centre for International Crime Prevention, New York 1999).
Dr. Marc Groenhuijsen
Victims’ Rights and Restorative Justice: Piecemeal Reform of the Criminal Justice
System or a Change of Paradigm?
1. Introduction
During the past two decades, nearly all modern criminal justice systems have been reformed
on behalf of victims of crime. In most jurisdictions change has been achieved by introducing
new procedural rights for individual victims. It is striking to observe the similarities of
victims’rights which have been introduced or expanded in criminal justice systems which are
otherwise hardly comparable. In this way, the Anglo-American adversarial systems on the one
hand and the more inquisitorial sytems on the European continent on the other have come to
harbor nearly identical provisions with respect to the interests of crime victims. In countries of
both legal families law enforcement officers are now required by law to treat victims with
respect for their dignity. Nowadays, the police and the prosecutors’ office must supply the
victim with information and explanation about the progress of the case. And in many
jurisdictions the victim has acquired a right to provide information to officials responsible for
making decisions relating to the offender. Victims furthermore have often been granted the
right to have legal advice avilable, regardless of their means. Attention has also been paid to
the right to protection, both for their privacy and for their physical safety. Finally, many
nations have improved systems in order to promote reparation to be payed by the offender or -
in cases where this proves to be impossible - State compensation.1
A number of years after the widespread introduction of these reform measures, at least
two general problems remain unsolved. The first one is about implementation.2 As has been
asserted many times before, it is relatively easy to pass legislation but it is infinitely more
difficult to actually make the new provisions work as intended. This point has been proven by
experience in almost every jurisdiction involved.3 The second issue which remains to be
4A wealth of material is collated and commented on by David Miers, An International
Review of Restorative Justice, (Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 10), London 2001.
5One of the compelling reasons for phrasing the question this way is that many
advocates of restorative justice actually claim they propose this kind of new paradigm. A
different (for other purposes equally useful) ‘typology of models’ is presented by James
Dignan & Michael Cavadino, ‘Towards a framework for conceptualising and evaluating
models of criminal justice from a victims’ perspective’, International Review of Victimology
1996, p. 153-182.
addressed concerns the precise theoretical nature of the reform efforts on behalf of crime
victims. Are the recently introduced victims’ rights mere refinements of the currently existing
criminal justice systems, or should they be considered as expressions of a new way of thinking
which is incompatible with the basic structure of the traditional model of administering
criminal justice? This question is also triggered by the fact that the introduction of new
victims’ rights is quite often presented as being part of the wider movement under the
umbrella label of restorative justice.4 
In this paper it will be argued that the two remaining problems I have referred to are
interconnected. The question of effective implementation can not be fruitfully tackled without
developing a well reasoned notion of the precise theoretical status of reform efforts in this
area. In the final analyses, the question about the epistemological status of modern type
victims’ rights is tantamount to a dispute about whether or not restorative justice is to be
considered as a new paradigm in the technical (Kuhnian) meaning of the word.5 In the
subsequent section, the position of those who do feel this is the case will be outlined. Section
3 then moves on to critically assess this view. It will be argued that the main properties of
restorative justice can to a large extent be incorporated in modernised features of traditional
criminal justice systems. And finally, in section 4, it will be demonstrated that a strategy
aiming at piecemeal reform of the current system offers a strategy which is superior to the
competing one with the objective of replacing the existing paradigm of criminal justice by the
brand new paradigm of restorative justice.
2. Analyses of what hampers effective implementation of modern victims’ rights in traditional
systems of criminal justice
According to a powerful school of thought, it is the paradigm underlying the present criminal
justice system which is responsible for its fatal flaws. This paradigm - the retributive
paradigm - is condemned as being counterproductive. It is accused of serving neither the best
interests of the State (because it does not effectively stop or reduce crime) nor those of its
primary ‘clients’, the perpetrators of crime and their victims. From a victimological point of
view it is contended that adopting new victims’ rights in a system based on the retributive
paradigm can never be regarded as more than paying lip-service to the ideals of restorative
justice. The existing legislative policy is criticised as ‘going through the motions’ of victim-
care, while at the same time neglecting the underlying interests which are really at stake.
Introducing victims’ rights in the traditional repressive system of criminal law is considered to
be a contradictio in terminus because the system itself does not allow any additional
perspective to be taken seriously outside the scope of the battle between the prosecutor and
the defendant. 
6Ezzat Fattah, ‘From a Guilt Orientation to a Consequence Orientation. A Proposed
New Paradigm for the Criminal Law in the 21st Century’, in: Wilfried Küper & Jürgen Welp
(eds.), Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft (Festschrift für Walter Stree und Johannes Wessels
zum 70. Geburtstag), Heidelberg 1993 p. 771-792. Ezzat Fattah, ‘Some reflections on the
paradigm of restorative justice and its viability for juvenile justice’, in: Lode Walgrave (ed.),
Restorative Justice for Juveniles. Potentialities, Risks and Problems, Leuven University Press
1998, p. 389-401. Another leading representative of this approach is R.E. Barnett,
‘Restitution: A new Paradigm of Criminal Justice’, Ethics. An International Journal of Social,
Political and Legal Philosophy, Vol. 87 (1977), no. 1, p. 279-301.
7Op.cit. p. 773.
8Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (1962), 2nd edition, Chicago
1970.
9See the summarising tables, op.cit. p. 791-792.
10Likewise: Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses. A New Focus for Crime and Justice,
Scottdale, Pennsylvania/Waterloo, Ontario1990, p. 82: “Since the state is defined as victim, it
is not surprising that victims are so consistently left out of the process and that their needs and
wishes are so little heeded. Why should their needs be recognized? They are not even part of
the equation of crime.”
Ezzat Fattah is one of the most prominent leaders of this school of thought.6 His
profound criticism of the current model of criminal justice - and its underlying paradigm - is
remorseless, even devastating. He claims that the conventional system is “in a state of crises”
because the retributive paradigm is “obsolete”, it relies on “inadequate old concepts” and
hence it is in “a state of Anachronism”. These defects are beyond repair, so Fattah concludes:
“All this points to the urgent need for the western nations to rethink, reassess, and modernize
the archaic and antiquated criminal codes of the 19th century to bring them to the standards
and requirements of the space age and to prepare them for the challenges of the 21st century”.7
Real progress can only be achieved by abandoning the retributive paradigm of criminal
justice. Victims’ rights can only be effectively implemented within the framework of a
comprehensive new paradigm. Indeed, Fattah announces that the stage seems to be set for a
scientific revolution or a paradigm shift in the sense proposed by Thomas Kuhn.8
A paradigm shift involves a complete and total overthrow of concepts, values,
objectives and principles within an academic discipline. Fattah confirms this by outlining the
stark contrast between the current system and the model he envisages for the future. His
sketch of some basic elements of the proposed new paradigm comprises several
compartments.9 
The first one is about different conceptualisations of crime. In the traditional paradigm
of criminal justice, crime is viewed as a wrongful, sinful, immoral wicked behavior that must
be punished. An essential element of crime also resides in the fact that it is considered to be
an offence against the State; crime is a violation of the public order, affecting society at large.
Because crime is defined as an offence against the State, it is obvious that there is no room for
interference by the victim in the aftermath of crime: the victim is by definition an outsider
who could never be accepted as a serious player during the course of a criminal procedure.10
Crime is furthermore perceived as a unique, exceptional category of behavior which is
qualitatively different from civil torts and other uncriminalized types of behavior. In other
11The most famous criticism of this aspect was expressed by Nils Christie, ‘Conflicts as
property’, Britisch Journal of Criminology 1977, p. 1-15.
words: there is an ontological reality of crime. Alternatively, in the proposed new paradigm
crime is viewed as a harmful, injurous behavior that needs to be redressed in the present and
prevented in the future. Crime is not seen as a manifestation of the wickedness of an
individual fellow citizen, but as a social risk, one of the many hazards of life in modern,
industral, technological society. Crime is no longer seen as an offence against the State, but as
a human conflict, a dispute between two parties. If this is the case, then it makes sense to also
involve both parties on an equal basis in subsequent legal proceedings. And there is no
recognition of the ontological reality of crime: it is exemplified by behavior which is neither
exceptional nor unique; it is not qualitatively different from tort; it can well be less serious,
less injurous and less dangerous than many other types of behavior outside the scope of
criminal law.
The second part is about fundamental concepts and principles. This touches on the core
essence of the difference between the old guilt oriented paradigm and the proposed new
consequence oriented paradigm. According to Fattah, the conventional system is based on
theological and metaphysical, abstract concepts, whereas the new model is founded on
concepts of a sociological, positivist and secular nature. Among the former category he ranks
moral guilt, mens rea (intent and negligence), malice and wickedness. The latter category is
about harm, injury, loss and endangerment. In the traditional paradigm moral responsibility is
the key concept, which is based on the presumption of the free will of the actor. Conversely,
the consequence oriented paradigm focuses on social responsibility which goes hand in hand
with the principle of strict liability.
The definition of crime and the fundamental concepts and principles have farreaching
implications for the characteristics and the goals of criminal law and procedure: the third and
final analytical compartment. According to Fattah, the current system is moralistic and
stigmatizing. In the new model, this should be replaced by a neutral, objective approach. The
presently existing system is idealistic in nature (i.e. its presumptions and vocabulary does not
always correspond to sociological realities) whereas its alternative is based on realism.
Traditional criminal law is repressive, retributive and punitive. In the new paradigm, these
properties should be replaced by characteristics such as being regulatory, distributive,
utilitarian, restitutive, restorative and preventive. In stead of a depersonalized, authoritarian
and adversarial attitude, a personalized and concilliatory approach should be installed. It is
wrong to always look backward, to be oriented to the past; instead, the system should be
oriented to the present and the future and thus ought to look forward. And finally, there is a
huge difference in the role of - and the connection between - those who have been directly
involved in the criminal act. Criminal law as we know it places the discretion in the hands of
third parties and distances the feuding parties, and in doing so widening the gap that separates
them.11 In the proposed alternative model the discretion is left in the hands of the parties
involved, which brings them together in order to effect reconciliation.
3. The capacity of the criminal justice system to be responsive to new demands and changing
circumstances
I happen to agree with most of the critical observations made by Fattah and his intellectual
companions. There is no doubt that the traditional system of criminal law, as we have known
it for a long time in most western jurisdictions, has serious shortcomings. It is highly
12The concept of responsive law is used as elaborated by Ph. Nonet & Ph. Selznick, Law
and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law, New York/Hagerstown/San
Francisco/London 1978.
13Hence the present discussion does not pertain to the views expressed by writers who
use the word ‘paradigm’ in a more casual way (like, among many others, Marlene Young,
‘Restorative community justice in the United States: a new paradigm’, International Review of
Victimology 1999, p. 265-277).
14See footnote 2 supra.
15Margaret Masterman, ‘The Nature of a Paradigm’, in: Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave
(eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge1970, p. 59-89.
questionable whether it has served society well; and it is undeniable that it has not served the
best interests of the principal parties, the offender and the victim. The system has unduly
focused on the past and has been unsufficiently oriented to the future. And it has equally
undisputably been preoccupied with allocating blame and inflicting pain instead of aiming at
providing amends for the harm that was done to the victim. 
So, the need for reform is obvious and this has been the case for quite a long time. The
real question, then, is about strategy. What appears to be the most effective way to bring about
the changes we are aiming for? This issue of strategy cannot be disconnected from a reflection
on the epistemological nature of the process in which change needs to be brought about. Do
the proposed new objectives really call for a new paradigm of criminal justice? If restorative
justice promises to be the answer to many of the defects of the current system, does that
automatically require that we abandon all basic concepts, values and objectives of the criminal
justice system that we grew up with? I am unconvinced. I feel that the goals and methods of
restorative justice can to a large extent be pursued by gradually adapting the traditional system
of administering criminal justice. I will argue that for methodological reasons they can even
be more effectively attained by adopting a piecemeal approach. In short, it will be argued that
the prevailing system of criminal justice is much more flexible - much more responsive12 -
than writers like Fattah assume.
Before moving on to answer the question whether it is desirable or even inevitable to opt for a
new paradigm of criminal justice, it is useful to make some preliminary remarks on the nature
of a paradigm. In this paper the concept of a paradigm is used in the technical sense of the
word.13 That means a paradigm is more than just a sweeping new idea and it is different from
just any ‘grand design’, blueprint or masterplan. The concept is used here with the content as
elucidated by Thomas Kuhn, from the perspective of the history of science.14
It has been pointed out that an initial difficulty is caused by Kuhn’s multiple definitions
of a paradigm. Margaret Masterman, for instance, counted no less than twenty-one different
descriptions.15 For the sake of brevity, I quote only a few significant examples:
- “[Paradigms are] universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide
model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners”
- “...some accepted examples of actual scientific practice - examples which include law,
theory, application, and instrumentation together - provide models from which spring
particular coherent traditions of scientific research. The study of paradigms (...) is what mainly
prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community with which he will
later practice”
16In Popperian language this would be called “the searchlight theory of science”; Karl
Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies. Part II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx
and the Aftermath, London 1966 (5th edition), p. 260; and Conjectures and Refutations,
London 1972 (4th edition), p. 45 ff.
17Margaret Masterman, op.cit. p. 70: “” (I)f we ask what a Kuhnian paradigm is, Kuhn’s
habit of multiple definition poses a problem. If we ask, however, what a paradigm does, it
becomes clear at once (assuming always the existence of normal science) that the construct
sense of ‘paradigm’, and not the metaphysical sense or metaparadigm, is the fundamental
one.”
18Thomas Kuhn, op.cit. p. 36, p. 60, p.131.
19Thomas Kuhn, op.cit. pp. 46-50.
- “To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need
not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted”
- “So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems
it defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply trough confident employment of
those tools. The reason is clear. As in manufacture so in science - retooling is an extravagance
to be reserved for the occasion that demands it”.
And so on, and so forth. The bottom line of these descriptions - in the sociological sense
- is that a paradigm is the sum total of the sources of problem-solving methods and standards
which are at a given point in time generally accepted by a given scientific community. Being a
general epistemological viewpoint, a paradigm is also an organising principle which can
govern perception itself.16  It is important to notice that this concept of a paradigm can not be
fully understood apart from the way it works in various stages of development of science.17 To
this end two stages must be distinguished: a period of  ‘normal science’ and the revolutionary
stage.
During a period of normal science, the paradigm both generates problems and serves as
a source of tools and devices to solve these problems. Problems are inescapable. There are
always new and unexpected situations which are - at first sight - inconsistent with the
theoretical framework provided by the obtaining paradigm (in technical jargon they are called
‘anomalies’). It is then considered to be the task of the scientific community to reconcile the
prevalent theory with the apparently contradicting data. This is what Kuhn refers to as finding
a way out of a ‘puzzle’. It is important to note that the existing paradigm determines which
puzzles are worth looking into. On top of that, a normal-scientific puzzle always has a
solution, which is guaranteed by the paradigm, but it takes ingenuity and resourcefulness on
the part of researchers to find it.18 Another part of the period of ‘normal science’ consists of
elaborating the paradigmatic theories and generating answers to questions which have up to
then only been raised by the paradigm.19 The key-insight which we need to keep in mind is
that the mere fact that there are anomalies - discrepancies between theory and observed facts -
is in itself neither unusual nor disturbing. Quite often it turns out that after a while an
explanation is discovered or the paradigmatic theory can be adapted in a way which reconciles
it with the problematic empirical findings. And even persistent and generally acknowledged
anomalies do not always lead to a crises in the cycle of normal science.
The picture only changes when the paradigm starts to show a continuous inability to
solve normal-scientific puzzles. And even then, the deep commitment to tradition will inhibit
many members of the scientific community to abandon their previously held beliefs and
20J.O. Wisdom, ‘The Nature of  “Normal” Science’, in: Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The
Philosophy of Karl Popper, Volume 14 in The Library of Living Philosophers, La Salle,
Illinois 1974, (p. 820-842) p. 829 : “Such facts give a sociological basis for the idea that
scientific theories do not get refuted; like old soldiers, they only fade away. This is the sort of
impression Kuhn conveys.”
21Margaret Masterman, op.cit. p. 82: “not just an incidental counter-argument to the
theory, or an awkward fact, which Kuhn correctly characterizes as merely an ‘irritant’. Neither
is it an extra-paradigmatic novelty, nor a problem which used to exist within the field at an
earlier stage, but which the developers of the paradigm have now suppressed and rendered
invisible, because it is incompatible with the paradigm’s ‘basic commitment’. The anomaly, to
be a true anomaly, has to be produced from within the paradigm.”
values. It is only when an alternative paradigm has surfaced, that fundamental change can be
contemplated. And the intellectual competition between a dominant paradigm and its potential
successor is not completely governed by rational considerations. For the most part, Kuhn
describes the eventual transition process in near-religious terms. Transferring allegiance to a
new paradigm is like an act of faith; it comes close to being converted to a different
denomination. An existing paradigm never loses its prominence because it clashes with a
single anomaly. It can only perish - over time - in competition with a succeeding paradigm.20
Yet the alternative paradigm has to meet at least two standards in order to be acceptable for
the community of professional researchers. First, the new candidate must hold a promise to
provide a solution for a vitally important and generally acknowledged problem21 which cannot
be tackled in any different way. And secondly the emerging new paradigm must retain a
substantial part of the problem-solving-capacity of the competing old paradigm.Only if and
when these conditions are met, a paradigm shift may be in the air. When succesful transition
has been completed, Kuhn speaks of a scientific revolution. 
For the purposes of the present contribution, it is important to keep in mind that the
battle between competing paradigms is a struggle for life. There can only be one winner.
Because of the ‘incommensurability’ of the theoretical frameworks, there is no room for
compromise. One cannot have it both ways by picking preferred bits and pieces from two
competing paradigms. Against this background we can now turn our attention again to the
epistemological status of restorative justice.
So, back to restorative justice. The basic question to be addressed in this section is whether it
is desirable - or even necessary - to pursue the objectives of restorative justice within the
framework of a completely new legal paradigm. Taking into account the information collated
in the preceding paragraphs, the first step towards an answer could be that it is most certainly
possible to position restorative justice as a new paradigm in the technical sense of the word.
The exposition by Fattah cum suis makes it abundantly clear that the quest for restorative
justice can be shaped in a way which is 100% incompatible with the traditional criminal
justice system. The next question then appears to be: is this the only viable way of looking at
restorative efforts in the aftermath of crime? And: would this be the most fruitful approach
when we try to balance expected advantages and unexpected drawbacks of such a move? As I
have already announced in the introductory lines of this section, I do not feel this is the case.
When restorative justice is positioned as a brand new comprehensive paradigm, the capacity
of the currently prevailing paradigm of criminal justice to adapt to new circumstances is
seriously underestimated. The potential of our traditional system to meet new standards and
22Howard Zehr, op.cit. p. 82.
23Bernd-Dieter Meier, ‘Restorative Justice - A New Paradigm in Criminal Law?’,
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 6/2, 1998, (p. 125-139)
p. 127: “... historically the necessary abstraction and institutionalization has led to a
diminution of the role of the victim in the criminal justice process, a reduction of the real-life
person stricken with injury, loss and fear to that of the bearer of a specific function in an
abstract, institutionalized and depersonalized procedure. The objective of the idea of
restorative justice, therefore, is to bring the personal and individual levels of the offence, the
experience of the harm and the consequences of the offence for the lives of the vicitm and
others, back to light and reintegrate these aspects into the process of criminal justice. The aim
of restorative justice is not (...) the abolishment of criminal justice, but an amendment to and
perhaps the completion of the criminal justice system by drawing the attention to elements
which have for a long time been rather neglected.”
24I am not particularly referring to petty crime; the following comments are basically
about more serious instances of crime.
additional demands is more impressive then the system is given credit for by its critics. Quot
erat demonstrandum.
On a conceptual level, Fattah contends that the first obstacle to change resides in the
definition of crime. According to conventional wisdom, crime is defined as an offence against
the State, a breach of the public order. This explains why the prosecutor acts as the
representative of society in a criminal trial, and it has also lead to the expulsion of the victim
from these proceedings. In my view, however, this line of reasoning rests upon a
dysfunctional reading of the definition of crime. From the undisputable starting point that the
state is indeed affected by criminal acts - because crime is a disruption of the public order -
some writers incorrectly  infer that the state is the real victim22 or even the only victim. There
is no compelling logic supporting this inference. Crime is clearly more than just an offence
against the State, or against society. In quite a few modern jurisdictions it is explicitly being
recognised that although the State is actually affected by criminal acts, the crime still is first
and foremost a violation of the individual victim’s rights. There is no single dogmatic obstacle
to acknowledge this basic fact. And if and when the definition of crime is expanded (or
interpreted more broadly) in this way, then it opens up new avenues to take the victims’
interests into account in the aftermath of the victimizing incident. It offers a dogmatic
justification for additional victims’ rights in criminal procedure, and it provides a solid basis
for taking victims’ interests into account when determining which punitive response can be
regarded as adequate.23
And there is more than just that.  We have to be cautious not to take things upside down.
When Fattah and Zehr critisize the one-sidedness of the definition of crime, they tend to
overstate their case. They substitute the victim by the State as the sole entity affected by
crime. In my view, this is clearly a bridge too far. Crime is still more than just a dispute
between two private parties; it involves more than a quarrel between two individuals.24
Because of the nature of the infraction, the victim has a legitimate right to claim the full
support of the legal order in the aftermath of crime. He is entitled to solidarity by society,
precisely because the violation of his private interests also constitutes a breach of the public
order. From this perspective it is only appropriate - as well as beneficial for victims - that the
State acts as a representative of society in general and of the victim in particular when it
25European Forum for Victim Services, Statement of Victims’ Rights in the Process of
Criminal Justice, London 1996, p. 5 (under the heading ‘Principles for the establishment of
victims’ rights’).
26Cfr. Jan J.M. van Dijk, ‘Strafrechtshervormingen ten behoeve van het slachtoffer in
internationaal perspectief’, in: Justitiële Verkenningen 1988/9, p. 7-27; J. Shapland et al.,
Victims in the criminal justice system, Cambridge 1985.
27D. Moxon, J.M. Corkery, C. Hedderman, Developments in the use of compensation
orders in magistrates’ courts since October 1988, London: HSMO 1992; and the general
overview in M.E.I. Brienen & E.H. Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European Criminal
Justice Systems, Nijmegen 2000, Chapter 26 (p.1057-1101).This study clearly shows that the
compensation order-model (restitution as penal sanction) is much more beneficial to victims
than the partie civile-model (restitution following a civil claim for damages during the
criminal trial).
28Cfr. Jan W. De Keijser, Punishment and Purpose. From Moral Theory to Punishment
in Action, Leiden 2000.
prosecutes crime. This point is particularly well articulated in a policy-document issued by the
European Forum for Victim Services: “Throughout Europe, the State has assumed
responsibility for prosecuting offenders and has removed from the victim the burden of
responsibility for determining any action to be taken in respect of the offender. The
acceptance of responsibility by the State should be recognised as a fundamental right of
victims of crime, and no attempts should be made to erode this by returning the responsibility
for decision making to victims.”25
The point may be underscored by a few remarks on the relevance of the particular
institutional framework in which restitution is being awarded to a crime victim. Empirical
evidence confirms that reparation paid by an offender to the victim in the framework of a
criminal trial has more impact than the same amount of money being transferred as a result of
a claim for damages - based on tort - in civil court.26 The moral support for this kind of
financial amends by the constitutional authority of institutions like the public prosecutor and
the trial judge enhances justice. It fortifies the conviction that financial compensation for
victims is not only a private affair but is also to be regarded as serving demands of public
interest.
Fattah further argues that criminal law is by nature moralistic, stigmatizing, oriented to the
past and backward looking. It would require a completely new system to be realistic,
utilitarian, oriented to the present and the future. In my view, however, the dogmatic
separation of punishment on the one hand and financial reparation or restitution on the other,
is a historical contingency.  The fundamental distinction between punishment and reparation
is a dogmatic aberration; it clearly constitutes a conceptual misunderstanding which can and
should be remedied within the current paradigm of criminal justice.
Quite a few jurisdictions have already proven that it is feasable as well as fruitful to
transcent the distinction between punishment and court ordered restitution. The most obvious
example of this is the succesful introduction of the compensation order.27 The rationale
behind the compensation order - and similar penal sanctions which have surfaced in other
jurisdictions under different names - is that forcing an offender to pay restitution to the victim
will serve all of the well established goals of traditional types of punishment.28 A very brief
29More on this is provided by Bernd-Dieter Meier, op.cit. p. 130 ff;  H.-J. Albrecht,
‘Kriminologische Perspektiven der Wiedergutmachung. Theoretische Ansätze und empirische
Befunde’, in: A. Eser et.al. (eds.), Neue Wege der Wiedergutmachung im Strafrecht, Freiburg
i.Br. 1990, p. 43-72; and Michael Cavadino & James Dignan, ‘Reparation, Retribution and
Rights’, International Review of Victimology 1997, p. 233-253.
30Marianne Löschnig-Gspandl, Die Wiedergutmachung im österreichischen Strafrecht.
Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Kriminalrecht?, Vienna 1996, p. 71 ff.
clarification of this point has to suffice.29  In a way, this type of restitution can be considered
as the most literal form of retribution. With regard to special prevention or rehabilitation, it is
likely that the awareness that one has to pay for the damages one has inflicted will at least
have the same dissuasive effect on future reoffending as the imposition of a fine to be payed
to the government. The same is true - mutatis mutandis - for general prevention, or
deterrence. And finally, the goal of conflict resolution is only on a very high level of
abstraction promoted by traditional forms of punishment; the compensation order probably
has more tangible effects in this respect.
The counter-argument, of course, has always been that punishment must be strictly
understood as intentionally inflicting pain. In the traditional retributive paradigm, the
occurence of a crime is supposed to trigger an automatic response. The guilty state of mind of
the offender (‘mens rea’) calls for a just desert. This is regarded as a basic principle of justice,
irrespective of the anticipated beneficial or detrimental effects of the imposition of such a
penalty. Within the framework of this perspective, forced reparation to the victim could never
count as real punishment. There are supposed to be two main reasons why a compensation
order could not be accepted as punishment per se. One is that there is a pre-existing obligation
(emanating from civil law) to reimburse the victim for damages, so that forced reparation does
not add anything in terms of adverse consequences of the crime. And the second reason is that
even when the compensation order would be accepted in the framework of a criminal trial, it
could never be imposed with the intention of inflicting pain on the perpetrator and hence it
would still have to be excluded from the list of avilable punitive sanctions.
In my view, these objections reveal a remarkable lack of sociological or empirical
consciousness. Valid as they may look from a narrow conception of legal doctrine, they
completely ignore the reality as experienced by the principal clients of the system: the victim
and the offender. For the offender, there is no difference in the imposition of a fine on the one
hand and an obligation to pay (the same amount of) restitution on the other. The proceeds of
the crime have usually been spend a long time before, so the financial burden is equal in both
situations. For the offender, the hardship - the pain - is neither affected by the recipient of the
financial offer he has to make (the state or the victim)  nor by its legal origin (tort/civil law vs
crime/punishment). This is the main justification for a steadily increasing number of
jurisdictions to elevate compensation orders to the same legal status as the more traditional
types of financial punitive sanctions.
And even when this is persistently rejected on dogmatic grounds, as it is the case in
many German speaking environments, it does not automatically follow that reparation is
beyond the scope of criminal law. Löschnig-Gspandl, for instance, holds the opinion that there
remains a fundamental gap between the goals of punishment and the goals of restitution. In a
carefully reasoned argument, though, she further stipulates that efforts to promote reparation
by the offender to the victim do coincide with the objectives of the criminal justice system and
hence can and must be incorporated in the penal process.30
31Brienen & Hoegen, op.cit. p. 1069 ff.; p. 1070: “The strict adherence to the principle
of civil liability should be slackened to allow the criminal court to (a) estimate, rather than
establish accurately, the level of damages, and (b) take the means of the offender into
consideration so that a realistically enforceable amount is awarded rather than a castle in the
air.”
32Howard Zehr, op.cit. p. 92.
33Howard Zehr, op.cit. p. 93.
34Perhaps this is the best moment to emphasize that ‘piecemeal’ reform and acting ‘step
by step’ does include the possibillity of fundamental reform, and can easily go hand in hand
with remarkable boldness, as may have become evident in the preceding exposition on the
Quite a few advocates of restorative justice complain about the theological and metaphysical
nature of the basic concepts of criminal law. The moral type of guilt is a case in point.
However, this type of criticism begs the question what damage could be done - and to whom -
by entering a moral aspect in the equation. If I see correctly, the moral dimension of the
decision on guilt (mens rea) is one of the key-parts of the justification of state interference in
the aftermath of crime. And this is not entirely without reason. When the state has failed to
protect its citizens against criminal victimization, the least it can do is to show solidarity with
the victim in the aftermath of crime. This acknowledgement of victimization includes the
allocation of moral blame: part of the process is about determining to what extent the offender
is responsible for the criminal act and for the damage it has caused. The public display of
disapproval of the criminal act helps restore the victim’s sense of order. It contributes to the
victim’s belief in a just society. And it assists victims in the process of coping with the effects
of crime. 
So, from the perspective of the victim I can see very little wrong with some of the
fundamental moral elements in the dogmatic superstructure of crime and punishment. On the
contrary, experience shows that it is quite often the narrow legal definitions of tort law which
prove to be beyond understanding for the victim of crime. The pioneering study of Brienen
and Hoegen concludes that the “first technical impediment that commonly frustrates the
general realisation of compensation for the victim through the adhesion model is the strict
adherence to the principle of civil liability”.31 Civil law is not a promising solution for crime
victims, it is one of the historical roots of their problems. 
Back to the main question of this section: the capacity of the criminal justice system to be
responsive to new demands and changing circumstances. Zehr is ruthless in his final
judgement: “Over time dysfunctions begin to develop as more and more phenomena do not fit
the paradigm. However, we keep trying to rescue the model by inventing epicycles, reforms,
which piece it together. Eventually, though, the sense of dysfunction becomes so great that the
model breaks down and is replaced by another.”32 According to Zehr, victim compensation
and assistance may be viewed as another such epicycle. In vain. As Zehr puts it, this approach
seeks to remedy a problem in the existing paradigm but it doesn’t question basic assumptions
about the state’s and the victim’s role in justice: “They recognize a legitimate problem but not
the root source of the problem.”33 I respectfully disagree. In the preceding paragraphs I have
tried to demonstrate that the criminal justice system - and its underlying conceptual
framework - can be reformed step by step to better serve the needs of all individuals
involved.34 In the terminology used by Thomas Kuhn: those who argue for restorative justice
changing concepts of crime and punishment. The word ‘piecemeal’is to be understood in the
limited meaning of referring to ‘non-paradigmatic’. 
35Specific attention to the various constituencies of restorative justice is also given by
Kent Roach, ‘Changing punishment at the turn of the century: Restorative justice on the rise’,
Canadian Journal of Criminology 2000, p. 249-280.
as a new paradigm apparently underestimate the problem solving capacity of the currently
prevailing paradigm.
4. Two strategies for effecting change
The result of the preceding sections is that there appear to be two strategies available for
improving the status of victims’ rights within the legal system. One is to aim for a change in
paradigm; the other is to opt for piecemeal reform of the current paradigm of criminal justice.
These strategies are mutually exclusive. So we are compelled to determine which one looks
most promising from the point of view of effectively promoting victims’ interests. My own
preference is for the piecemeal approach. There are two sets of arguments supporting this
position.
The first cluster of arguments is derived from the nature of a paradigm, as explained in the
previous section. A paradigm refers to a complete ‘world view’. It comprises all convictions,
concepts, values, priorities and principles prevalent in a given academic discipline. It also
entails objectives, goals, and standards of success. The comprehensive - all encompassing -
nature of a paradigm has farreaching theoretical and practical implications. The most striking
one is that competing paradigms are, in Kuhn’s words, ‘incommensurable’. The
incommensurability of different paradigms means there is an ‘incomplete logical contact’
between them. In ordinary language this means that advocates of different paradigms can
hardly engage in a productive dialogue. Success and improvements within the framework of
one paradigm is regarded as irrelevant or futile in another. So, arguing for a new paradigm
manifestly limits room for rational debate. There is no common ground to serve as a basis for
communication, let alone for persuasion.
The features of the theoretical concept of a paradigm yield two concrete arguments
against the strategy which obtains for a battle for restorative justice as a new paradigm. First,
the absence of any room for compromise leads to a final choice between either criminal
justice or restorative justice. If the inevitable decision is presented in this binary way, it looks
extremely unlikely that a general sentiment will swing in the latter direction. I do not consider
it realistic to expect that a majority in the academic community will be prepared to completely
abandon all the existing basic propositions of criminal law and procedure. On top of that, we
have to keep in mind that there are many other different stakeholders in connection with the
operation of the criminal justice system.35 Legislators, politicians, professionals like judges,
prosecutors and defence attorneys, as well as the public at large, they all have ideas, opinions
and quite often even strong feelings about crime and the best ways to respond to crime. My
point here is that academic discourse in this area does not prosper in a social vacuum. It is - by
contrast - strongly interconnected with cultural circumstances prevailing in society at a given
period in time. Taking this kind of socio-cultural intangibles into account, it looks all the more
unlikely that there will be a radical - indeed: a revolutionary - shift in world-view leading to
the overthrow of all previously held convictions surrounding the concepts of crime and
36It must be noted that when restorative justice is presented as a new paradigm, it can
only succeed by eliminating criminal law as we have known it for centuries. In this sense, it
can not be denied that the movement pressing for a new paradigm is essentially abolitionist in
nature.
37Elmar G.M. Weitekamp, ‘The Paradigm of Restorative Justice: Potentials, Possibilities
and Pitfalls’, in: Jan J.M. van Dijk et.al. (eds.), Caring for Crime Victims: Selected
Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on Victimology, Monsey, New York 1999,
p. 122-123.
38This point has been made before by, among others, L. Zedner, ‘Victims’, in: M.
Maguire et.al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Oxford 1994, p. 1239.
punishment. In this sense, legal doctrine is different from, for instance, the domain of
theoretical physics. 
The second argument is closely linked to the first one. It points to the problem that there
is no way of managing the transition process from one paradigm to another. The transition
process is described as a semi religious experience, a collective conversion to a new belief.
Since there is no opportunity for rational debate between the converted and the not-yet-
converted (see above), there are no guidelines on how to effectively advocate a dominant
status for the new paradigm. This only compounds my reservations concerning the possibility
that restorative justice could ever prevail at the expense of the traditional system of
administering criminal justice.36 In this light, aiming for a new paradigm does not even come
close to a potentially succesful strategy for promoting victims’ rights.
The second set of considerations supporting my preference for a strategy of piecemeal reform
is also based on the alleged comprehensive nature of the alternative model of restorative
justice. Let me first recall the basic conditions which have to be met in order for a potential
new paradigm to be acceptable to the scientific community. According to Kuhn, the new
paradigm must hold a promise to leave a major part of the problem solving capacity of the old
paradigm intact. And on top of that it should offer a solution for a major and generally
acknowledged problem which can not be overcome in any other way. 
In my view, it is highly questionable whether these standards are met by restorative
justice as a candidate paradigm. During the 9th international symposium on victimology,
Weitekamp correctly observed: “Even if we would come close to [a system of restorative
justice] we still need parts of the current system in order to guarantee the rights of offenders
and foremost of victims who do not want to participate in programs of restorative justice.
Further on we will have offenders for whom this approach will not work and who have to be
incarcerated in order to protect citizens, communities and societies.”37 I think it is
undisputable that his point can be generalised. We need a punitive criminal justice system for
the large number of cases where restorative justice just does not work. The existing system of
criminal justice is for instance indispensable in cases of ‘victimless crime’, such as trafficking
illicit narcotics.38 And we could not do without traditional criminal law in instances where a
larger group of citizens is victimised, but where individuals are not affected to an extent that
justifies mediation or other types of restorative interventions: environmental crime or
economic crime are the obvious examples in this respect. And last but not least, some cases of
hard core crime are so serious that it would - for the time being - be inconceivable to consider
them as a private affair between the offender and the victim. The examples of murder and rape
39Bernd-Dieter Meier, op.cit. p. 131: “There are good reasons to assume that somewhere
there is a border beyond which the general public is not willing to accept restorative justice as
the only form of reaction to the offence but calls for retribution and punishment”, with
additional references.
40Examples of this have been outlined in the preceding sections, where redefinitions of
the concepts of crime and punishment have been discussed within the framework of the
currently existing system.
41Martin Wright, ‘Can Mediation be an Alternative to Criminal Justice?’, in: Burt
Galaway & Joe Hudson (eds.), Restorative Justice: International Perspectives, Monsey,
NY/Amsterdam 1996, p. 227-237. Idem: Christa Pelikan, ‘UN draft resolution on restorative
justice programmes in criminal matters’, in: Newsletter of the European Forum for Victim-
Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice, Vol. 3, Issue 1 (February 2002), p. 7: “Great
emphasis was put on the fact that RJ programmes are complementary to the CJS, not an
alternative and not at all intended to replace the conventional system.”
42The same conclusion was reached by Bernd-Dieter Meier, op.cit. p. 139: “the
assessment that the idea of restorative justice stands for a ‘paradigm shift’ in the criminal law
system is certainly too euphoric. Instead, it seems more appropriate to describe restorative
justice as a new perspective in the criminal law system.”
quickly come to mind.39 On top of that there is the problem that in a majority of cases the
perpetrator is never found or arrested. In all of these instances the concept of restorative
justice as advocated in a new paradigm loses much of its meaning. Yet even when the
offender is not apprehended, the victim is still in need of some assistance and support by law
enforcement agencies. His interests must be taken care of; he needs (e.g. informational) rights
vis-a-vis the government during the investigation.
It is important to be aware of the fact that these limitations can not be presented or
interpreted as exceptions to the rule. Restorative justice is not a promising new paradigm
which is - because of its infant stage of development - confronted with some challenging
anomalies (in the examples just referred to) which will disappear in due time. Quite the
opposite appears to be the case. Criminal law in its traditional structural form will at least
remain part of our conception of justice in the extended future. To recognise this inevitable
fact is by definition incompatible with the claim that restorative justice is a new paradigm in
the true sense of the word.
5. Concluding remarks
My conclusion is that restorative justice is a great idea, a convincing philosophy and a
wonderful inspiration, but it is not a new paradigm. The idea is being used - as it ought to be -
to reform and improve the criminal justice system step by step. These steps need not to be
small or insignificant ones. Quite the contrary: piecemeal reform can actually take the form of
the proverbial giant leap.40 Like Martin Wright has written before, it is better to think not of
alternatives but of a continuum, and to work to move the centre of gravity from the repressive
towards the restorative.41 In this sense, restorative justice can be a guiding principle.42 The
concepts and objectives it has yielded can lead to carefully planned and evaluated experiments
aimed at improving the position of victims in the criminal justice system. This is the most
responsible - and effective - way of shaping reform.
Just a final remark on the practical relevance of the basic question addressed in the
present exposition. It may look a little academic to explore the technical meaning of the
concept of a paradigm and to see how restorative justice fits into that concept. Why not allow
a more casual use of the word paradigm? After all, it can hardly be contested that restorative
justice is a relatively new, broad, appealing idea.
In my view it is important to understand the exact epistemological status of restorative
justice, because this also has significant practical implications. When university students are
educated on the virtues of restorative justice, they are usually interested and perceptive. The
same is true for law enforcement officials like the police and prosecutors. They only turn
apprehensive when they are being told that the only way to take restorative justice seriously is
to abandon all beliefs, concepts and objectives attached to the traditional system of criminal
law. For most people, this is just a bridge too far. So in order to promote interest in the
potential of restorative justice it is important to state the exact nature and extent of the
proposed reform efforts. Victims’ rights are about improving a system, not about abolishing a
system and then starting from scratch.
Thomas Kuhn’s book on scientific revolutions has been extraordinarily influential. It
has also been misinterpreted. After the book was published, some thinkers felt that the only
way to really contribute to academic discourse is to propose or conduce to a scientific
revolution. Kuhn means differently. Progress is usually achieved during periods of  ‘normal
science’. 
